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A political system with high consensus requirements due to the presence of veto players 
is fertile ground for self-regulation by associations such as employers’ organisations and 
unions. As Scharpf (1997: 204) emphasised, they perform their regulatory functions ‘in 
the shadow of the state’. The government could intervene if there was a political 
consensus at odds with the regulatory choices made by the associations, but this is 
unlikely. An agreement reached between representatives of the main social classes can be 
expected to be close to the consensus political position. In any case the transaction costs 
of developing an alternative political position are high. 
 
In this light, the recent introduction of a statutory national minimum wage (SMW) in 
Germany poses two puzzles: how were the main political parties (the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats) able to agree, and why did employers and unions 
fail to make their own agreements? Successive governments clearly preferred the self-
regulatory alternative, and went to some lengths to create a framework which would 
allow employers and unions to determine sectoral minimum wages. Only when these 
initiatives were clearly seen to have failed did the Social Democrats switch their position 
to a statutory measure, and ultimately carry the larger party, the Christian Democrats, 
along with them. 
 
Political deference to corporatist bargaining is not without its critics. While Katzenstein 
(1987) lauded the stability generated by the preference of politicians in Germany’s ‘semi-
sovereign state’ for promoting self-regulation by associations, Streeck (2003) advanced a 
withering critique of the pursuit of private interests by the labour market parties and the 
incapacity of the political system to pursue public interest-regarding reforms. Hardly had 
Streeck published his account when the government embarked on the Hartz reforms, a 
succession of social security and employment measures developed with limited 
involvement of the representatives of labour and capital, pushed through by a government 
that was notionally a Red-Green coalition but in practice a grand coalition (following 
Schmidt’s (2002) use of the term), relying on centre-right support to navigate the 
obstacles of the political process.  
 
Some commentators saw this as a profound shift in German political economy (Vail 
2003), but many assessments were more muted. Social partner governance of public 
institutions (notably the Federal Employment Agency) was curtailed, as was the 
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‘externalisation’ of employment adjustment costs onto the social insurance system 
(Trampusch 2005). Otherwise, the main thrust of the measures was to reduce statutory 
regulation of terms and conditions of employment, without impeding the rights of the 
parties to make their own agreements on how the new ‘flexibilities’ would be utilised. 
The result was dualisation: negotiated protection of the conditions of the core, organised 
workforce alongside a substantial expansion of peripheral employment where employer 
prerogatives held sway. Palier and Thelen (2010) argue that dualisation explains the 
political feasibility of reforms: corporatist bargaining prevailed but in a more limited 
domain than before. The result was, in many ways, business as usual (Hassel 2014). 
 
What had changed, however, was the capacity of the parties to regulate the peripheral 
labour market. This was hardly a pressing issue when the thrust of government policy 
was liberalising and deregulatory: there was no shadow from the state. The main trigger 
for re-regulation was an emerging problem of fiscal externalities. The expansion of low-
paid employment and the proliferation of ‘mini-jobs’ lacking social insurance coverage 
led to financial pressures on both social insurance and social assistance. A robust rate of 
job creation partly covered the trail of these costs, but implicit subsidies to low paid jobs 
increasingly became the target of political criticism in the 2000s. 
 
While fiscal externalities were the concern of the state rather than the labour market 
parties, successive governments nonetheless tried to promote a self-regulatory solution. 
Until 2009, both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats favoured establishing 
minimum wages in low-wage sectors through collective bargaining. Employers and 
unions would make collective agreements and the government would render them 
universally applicable, binding all firms in the sector whether or not they were party to 
the agreement. The motive for employers to cooperate was that this process would 
regulate competition. The favoured legal instrument was the 1996 Posted Workers Act, 
which had been introduced to ensure that workers on sites in Germany had to be paid 
minimum wages agreed by German employers, even if they were employed by firms 
based outside Germany in countries where lower wages prevailed. 
 
This paper examines why it was apparently not possible, or not adequate, to lend the 
authority of the state to the social partners to facilitate self-regulation and secure 
minimum wages based on collective agreements. Employers may seek to conclude these 
agreements in order to regulate competition, but this requires a consensus on the 
desirability of such regulation as well as mechanisms to prevent defection from the 
agreement. The competition-regulating motive for setting minimum wages could not gain 
traction in the intensified competitive environment that emerged after reunification. The 
inability of employers and unions to collude sufficiently to preserve Tarifautonomie 
(independence in wage-setting) in the face of political pressure shows the limitations of 
Germany’s vestigal corporatist institutions. 
 
The approach taken in the following discussion emphasises strategic interaction between 
employers, unions and the government in the making of policy. The central idea is that 
both employers and unions have incentives to ‘self-regulate’: to reach agreements on 
wages and working conditions that do not provoke the intervention of the government. 
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However, the strength of these incentives depends on the nature of the threat of 
government intervention. Culpepper (2011: 183) proposes that, in areas such as wage 
determination, which are salient to voters but primarily left to the market (‘informal 
rules’ in Culpepper’s taxonomy), the social partners share an interest in making 
compromises in order to prevent intervention. This does not depend on calculations about 
the likely nature of government intervention, but rather on a common desire to preserve 
autonomy and reduce political risk. If employers believe that the government’s stance is 
likely to be broadly neoliberal and deregulatory, they have less incentive to reach 
agreements with unions – but then the unions in their turn have more reason to make 
concessions to sustain self-regulation. If unions believe that at least some of their goals 
will be achieved by statutory regulation if negotiation with employers fails, they have 
more reason to adopt an intransigent bargaining position, but it is then the employers’ 
turn to recognise the threat and make concessions. If the parties have common 
information, they should evaluate threats in a similar way and be able to reach agreement. 
 
It follows that, if government intervention happens, it must either be because of 
miscalculation, or because, despite their recognition of threat, the parties have been 
unable to behave strategically. The discussion below shows how intensified competition 
undermined employers’ capacity for strategic action, and this in turn limited the 
opportunities for unions to promote self-regulation.  
 
After a preliminary outline of the various institutional mechanisms for setting minimum 
wages in Germany, the paper proceeds by examining in turn the strategies adopted by the 
three parties: employers, unions and the government. The puzzle about employers is why 
they did not give more support to the collective bargaining system, and thereby pre-empt 
the threat of state intervention. This is discussed in section 3, while section 4 turns to the 
unions, and asks why their endorsement of the SMW became more wholehearted and less 
confined to the unions in the weakest bargaining position. As with employers, unions 
have an interest in maintaining the autonomy of collective bargaining. However, they are 
also able to operate as political actors, and their political opportunities and capacities 
increased in the 2000s relative to their diminishing industrial strength.  
 
The political environment in its turn became more receptive because of the emerging 
problem of low pay linked to welfare reform (section 5). Yet the two main parties were 
some distance apart on minimum wage policy, and the chances of agreement looked 
remote right up until the 2013 election. Both the principle of establishing a single national 
minimum wage and the initial level for the wage (€8.50 per hour) were agreed politically: 
a striking contrast with the UK, where the setting of the initial level was delegated to a 
Commission (Mabbett 2014). However, the moment of political agreement was evidently 
not expected to last: power to determine future increases has been delegated to a 
commission of union and employer representatives. The concluding section briefly 
speculates on how this new commission will function and draws out some implications 
for the analysis of German corporatism. 
  
   
2. The recent history of minimum wage regulation in Germany 
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The main procedure for establishing sectoral minimum wages in Germany was initially 
established for the construction industry through the transposition of the European 
Union’s Posted Workers Directive in 1996. The Directive was largely a response to 
German pressure to create a mechanism for host state regulation of the terms and 
conditions of workers employed under contracts made in another member state, who were 
temporarily engaged elsewhere in the EU. This was a pressing concern in the 
construction industry in the post-reunification building boom, when workers from other 
states took up jobs at wages lower than prevailing unemployment insurance levels for 
German workers. The Directive allowed member states to declare minimum wages in 
collective agreements universally applicable, binding all workers on their soil.  
 
As the discussion below explains, the sectoral coverage of the Posted Workers Act was 
subsequently extended, and its procedures proved more accessible than those provided by 
other legal instruments. Before 1996, two mechanisms existed to establish sectoral 
minimum wages in Germany, but one was in abeyance and the other was little used. The 
1952 Minimum Working Conditions Act (Mindestarbeitsbedingungengesetz, MiArbG) 
created a procedure for situations where there was no collective agreement in place. On 
application from employer associations, unions or Land governments, a committee could 
investigate whether a minimum wage was required. If so, an expert committee of 
employers and union representatives with an independent chair could determine a 
generally-applicable minimum wage. The procedure was reformed in 2009, increasing 
the representation of government officials on the relevant committees and giving the 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) the power to establish a 
committee on its own initiative to assess the situation in an industry and choose an 
existing collective agreement as the standard for extension. The procedure is limited to 
sectors where unionisation rates are low, and the consent of the social partners is not 
required. After the 2009 reform, investigations took place, but without any quick results 
(Bosch and Weinkopf 2010:4).  
 
There is also a mechanism in the law on collective bargaining (the TVG, section 5) to 
give collective agreements application across a sector, binding employers who were not 
parties (‘Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung’ AVE). Agreements have to be made in 
accordance with the TVG, at least 50% of employees have to be covered by the 
employers party to the agreement, and the employer and union sides have to agree that an 
extension would be in the public interest. A council of representatives of the peak 
organisations of business and labour, the ‘Tarifausschuss’, hears submissions from the 
parties and makes a (consensual) recommendation to the government (Heitzler and Wey 
2010: 20). Use of this mechanism declined after 1990. The employers’ association, the 
BDA, estimates that some 500 out of 70,000 collective agreements are currently declared 
generally binding in this way.1  
 
The Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz 1996, the PWA) enabled unions 
and employers in a sector to conclude a collective agreement which could then be made 
universally applicable by executive order (Rechtsverordnung, RVO). This bound posted 
workers so long as their home state wages and conditions of employment were inferior to 




those in the agreement; of course it also bound all German workers in the sector. The 
scope of terms and conditions that could be extended is limited to those specified in the 
European directive; most importantly, only minimum wages are extended, not the whole 
wage structure that is often specified in collective agreements.  
 
On first application for extension under the Posted Workers Act, the application has to be 
considered by the Tarifausschuss (see above). Initially, the BDA enjoyed the same veto 
power over extensions as it has for AVE applications under the TVG. However, in 1998 
the Red-Green coalition amended the Act to remove the veto power of employers. This 
provision is criticised by the BDA, which argues that the use of RVOs overreaches 
appropriate bounds, whereas the AVE procedure is (correctly) constrained by being 
subject to the agreement of the social partners.2 Other reforms to the Posted Workers Act 
expanded the sectors covered, and a major amendment in 2009 addressed some problems 
caused by conflicting collective agreements, discussed further below. 
 
The procedure of making RVOs under the PWA became the dominant method for 
establishing sectoral minimum wages. Many commentaries assert that it is the only 
effective method available, and argue that the Act ‘is increasingly used to regulate wage 
competition internally.’ (Grimshaw et al 2014: 486). Heitzler and Wey (2010: 20) claim 
that ‘the Act’s main purpose has become to enforce minimum wages in several service 
sectors on domestic firms.’ But of course the distinction between domestic and cross-
border competition cannot necessarily be made clearly. The opening clause of the PWA 
states that it is intended to regulate cross-border work, but also to regulate competition 
more generally and to maintain the collective bargaining system. The text of the recent 
RVO in meat processing (see below) draws attention to the presence of posted workers 
from abroad in the sector, and also to the employment of women at very low wages. In 
short, a boundary between regulating migrants and regulating internal competition was 
not established. 
 
While constraints on the sectoral coverage of the PWA were eased, and other procedural 
limitations also eased in successive reforms, its efficacy in establishing sectoral minimum 
wages had constraints that could not be surmounted by legislation. Some low-wage 
sectors had no Germany-wide agreement eligible for extension, while others had several 
agreements made with competing unions, including agreements of doubtful validity under 
the TVG. One consequence of the latter tendency was that there were often severe delays 
in making agreements universally applicable. These conflicts and delays were a factor in 
drawing the unions towards support for a single SMW, where the stronger unions had 
previously favoured extension of collective agreements. 
 
In the 2005 election campaign, the SPD declared that it would introduce a statutory 
minimum wage if the social partners could not agree minima for all sectors, while the 
CDU/CSU affirmed its commitment to securing minimum conditions sector by sector 
through collective bargaining augmented by universal application. As noted above, the 
Grand Coalition of 2005-9 reformed the Minimum Working Conditions Act and the 





Posted Workers Act in an endeavour to make the sectoral alternative work. The right-
wing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP (2009-13) did not take further steps: the FDP stood 
out in opposition to universal application and other regulatory interventions, insisting that 
these would cost jobs. 
 
When another Grand Coalition was formed in 2013, the CDU/CSU finally conceded a 
SMW of €8.50 per hour, which came into force on 1 January 2015. However, the centre-
right parties left their mark on the legislation, which is, somewhat paradoxically, entitled 
‘Law to strengthen collective bargaining’ (Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz). Reforms to 
both the AVE and RVO procedures are included in the legislation. The 50% threshold for 
extension of a collective agreement using the AVE procedure has been relaxed, and the 
Posted Workers Act is no longer confined to specified sectors. More important, the 
government’s reluctance to override agreements in force means that the application of the 
€8.50 minimum has been delayed in some sectors, until current agreements run out. 
Given the difficulties that the unions have had in concluding collective agreements, there 
must have been some chagrin at the surge in agreements concluded in 2012-14. 
Particularly notable was the agreement made in the meat processing sector, one of the 
industries most notorious for low pay, long hours and poor conditions. The agreement 
was made in January 2014, and extended by government order in March 2014.3  
 
3. Employers’ preferences and strategies 
One question presented by the narrative above is why employers were not more willing to 
promote the protectionist use of minimum wages to regulate competition in sectors 
exposed to competition from providers in other EU states. The explanation lies partly in 
the preferences of employers, and partly in the aggregation of preferences by employers’ 
associations. Employers’ preferences were divided: some expected to benefit from 
regulation while others preferred open competition. This section explains how the 
preferences of the latter came to prevail, both because of their effect on the coordinative 
capacity of employers’ associations and because of their influence on the peak business 
associations, the BDA and the BDI. 
 
Firms already exposed to international competition had no interest in sponsoring 
protectionist regulation in response to migration and service sector liberalization in 
Europe. Indeed, they could benefit by obtaining ancillary services in more competitive 
markets. In the early 1990s, the dominant tenor of the times in Germany was that wage 
concessions were needed in firms that had suffered a loss of competitiveness due to 
innovation and lower costs in other countries. Firms under competitive pressure used 
‘opening clauses’ in collective agreements to pay sub-agreement wages. They also 
reached agreements with their core workforces on cost-cutting measures involving 
subcontracting peripheral services, thereby driving wages down in those sectors. Palier 
and Thelen (2010) document the rising share of temporary workers on inferior contracts, 
and the pressure placed on small firms by the large firms they supply. These aggressive 
outsourcing and cost-cutting strategies were not so evident in (for example) the Nordic 
countries, and they gave Germany a competitive edge that is not revealed by direct wage 
comparisons (Dustmann et al 2014).  





The German model before reunification was characterised by export sector wage 
leadership, along with coordination among industrial employers to comply with industry 
collective agreements and avoid competitive bidding-up of wages to attract skilled 
labour. The counterpart of this coordination was that firms could train workers in the 
confident expectation that they would not be poached by other firms in the industry. 
Institutions to ensure high investment in specific skills were a key source of Germany’s 
comparative advantage. In the conditions of the 1990s, this coordination was less 
important, as ‘negative drift’ (payment of wages below collectively agreed levels) 
became more prevalent. Furthermore, divisions between employers over wage bargaining 
policy became apparent. The key division was between large firms and SMEs in the 
export sector. Hassel (2007a: 260-1) documents how large firms were better able to bear 
wage increases than small ones, due to their greater ability to reorganise production to 
achieve productivity gains. Large firms were also better equipped than small firms to 
externalise adjustment costs onto the social insurance system, particularly through the use 
of early retirement. One consequence was that firms removed themselves from coverage 
by collective agreements: the share of employees covered in the metal sector fell from 
more than 75% in the 1970s and 1980s to 55% in the mid-2000s. 
 
To avoid coverage, firms had to leave the relevant sectoral employers’ association. 
Associations responded by trying to attract members back on different terms: specifically, 
by offering the opportunity to belong without signing up to the collective agreement 
(membership ‘ohne Tarif’ or OT). While this stemmed the flow, it also pointed to a loss 
of capacity on the part of the associations. No longer could they regulate wage 
bargaining. For most, this was of limited importance given that prevailing wage pressures 
were downwards, but it meant that associations lacked the capacity to take up the 
government’s invitations to establish minimum wages. Two examples illustrate the 
issues. 
 
The cleaning sector provides an example where some employers favoured making a 
collective agreement to regulate competition and thereby limit low pay. For this to work, 
universal application was critical. For a group of employers to make an agreement, only 
to find that it could not be extended to others, would be a competitive disaster. 
Furthermore, there are strong incentives to free-ride by indicating support for the 
principle of a binding minimum wage but then taking any opportunity to pay less. Bosch 
and Weinkopf (2010: 20) note that, while the cleaning sector employers’ association 
supported a minimum wage, ‘the strategies and positions of employers [within the sector] 
are more diverse.’ 
 
Before 2008, cleaning was not one of the sectors covered by the PWA, so any extension 
of a collective agreement would have to be done by the AVE procedure in the law on 
collective bargaining. The ‘blocking tactics’ of the BDA in the Tarifausschuss were a 
barrier to universal application (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008: 309). An amendment to the 
PWA in 2008 brought the cleaning industry under its procedure, where the BDA did not 
have a veto, but it still took until 2010 for a collective agreement to be made and 
extended (Bosch and Weinkopf 2010: 20).  
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Strikingly, in 2008 the employers’ association in the cleaning sector supported a SMW 
rather than an extended collective agreement for the cleaning sector. The key reason was 
that the sectoral agreement covered cleaning companies, but not employers in other 
sectors who may have employees ‘in house’ doing cleaning jobs (Bosch and Weinkopf 
2010: 30). There is some evidence that competition between in-house and outsourced 
provision pushed wages down; for example in the health care sector concessions were 
made in collective agreements to prevent outsourcing.  
 
A different set of problems marked the regulation of wages in the postal service, where 
the high-wage incumbent sought to use a sectoral wage agreement to prevent entry by 
low-wage competitors. The letter market was to be opened up to competition in 2008, 
sparking concerns that new entrants would undermine wages in the sector. In mid-2007, 
the Grand Coalition agreed in principle to add postal services to the sectors covered by 
the Posted Workers Act. The main employer, Deutsche Post, established a Postal 
Employers Association, and moved quickly to reach a collective agreement with the 
service sector union Verdi (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft; the united services 
union). Legislation amending the Posted Workers Act was passed, and, proceeding rather 
more expeditiously than in some previous cases, the Federal Ministry of Labour declared 
the agreement generally binding.  
 
Prospective competitors responded to the Deutsche Post-Verdi agreement by establishing 
their own employers’ association and reaching an agreement with a newly-formed union. 
The competitors’ association challenged the minimum wage established by the Federal 
Ministry in court, claiming that their own agreement should be recognised. This claim 
was initially successful: the court ruled that a minimum wage could only be imposed on 
employers and workers not bound by any agreement. However, another court decision 
established that the new union was not ‘tariff enabled’ and the competitors’ collective 
agreement was not valid. An appeal from the first ruling held that the decision on 
universal application had not been made correctly by the Ministry, as it had failed to give 
the other parties an opportunity to comment. An amendment to the Posted Workers Act in 
2009 corrected this and established a procedure for dealing with the situation where more 
than one collective agreement has been concluded in a sector (Heitzler and Wey 2010). 
 
This case illustrates how employer divisions could impede the establishment of sectoral 
minimum wages. Traxler (2010: 160) used this example to illustrate the general point that 
intensified competition between firms will give rise to conflicts of interest, for example 
between large and small firms, that employers’ associations have difficulty mediating. 
The case also shows that the ability of the government to promote the model of self-
regulation was constrained: this model exposed the government to judicial challenges that 
it would not face if it set a minimum wage using statutory authority. It is also notable that 
the government’s position on the promotion of competition was ambivalent: on one hand, 
it initiated the liberalisation of the letter market (partly in response to EU-level 
measures), but on the other hand it insisted that competitive advantage should not be 
established by ‘wage dumping’.  
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While employer divisions impeded the making and extension of collective agreements, 
the inclusion of more sectors in the PWA in 2008 did see some agreements made. Unions 
were often willing to make concessions to secure a continuation of collective bargaining. 
The agency work sector provides an example: collective agreements in the sector have 
resulted in wage scales running on average some 25-30% those prevailing for established 
workers (Eichhorst 2015: 59). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that employers’ associations to some extent lacked the 
appetite, as well as the capacity, for coordinated action. This was evident in the BDA’s 
resistance to universal application under the PWA, which presumably reflected the 
interests of export sector firms in keeping domestic costs down. It was also apparent in 
business campaigns for liberalizing reforms. These were led by the BDI rather than the 
BDA (Kinderman 2005). Hans-Olaf Henkel of the BDI spoke up for the concerns of the 
Mittelstand, whereas the BDA was dominated by large employers who were better placed 
to adapt to high labour costs. The BDI sought radical reforms to social policy to reduce 
non-wage labour costs. Attempts to negotiate reforms through corporatist policy channels 
had produced little result, and the BDI ‘demanded that the government act on its own to 
reverse the trend of the past decade’ (Streeck 2003: 16). As noted in the introduction, 
liberalizing measures were implemented in the early 2000s without corporatist 
negotiation, under the umbrella of the Hartz reforms.  
 
From an institutional perspective, the ability of the Red-Green coalition to push through 
these measures indicated that unilateral government reform measures had become more 
viable, by contrast with received accounts of Germany’s ‘semi-sovereign’ state in which 
reforms had to be negotiated with employers and unions.. The new-found capacity of the 
government to engage in deregulatory liberalizing reforms also implied a capacity to 
undertake re-regulation, but this threat did not detain employers in the early 2000s. 
 
 
4. The Unions’ Change of Heart 
Many accounts of German unions from the 1990s and early 2000s emphasise their 
investment in corporatist institutions and attachment to strategies of externalising costs 
onto the social insurance system. This has led to vigorous criticism of their role in 
defending ‘insider’ interests (Palier and Thelen 2010). Hassel (2007b) described the 
established unions’ failure to recruit new members as ‘the curse of institutional security’. 
DGB unions defended their institutional monopolies against new entrants (although with 
diminishing success – see Hassel 2007b: 188-9), and failed to find new members among 
younger workers and women, who are severely under-represented. 
 
To some extent, these criticisms highlight known weaknesses in the capacity of German 
unions to defend the interests of the working class as a whole. The sectoral basis of 
bargaining always meant that there was limited ‘solidarity’ in the Swedish sense, 
whereby wage settlements for workers with less industrial power caught up with the well-
organised leaders. So long as demand conditions were sufficiently accommodating and 
unemployment was low, wages in the less organised parts of the service sector held up, 
but ‘German trade unions were not strong enough and not sufficiently centralized to 
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pursue a solidaristic wage policy that would have led to lasting reductions in pay 
differentials.’ Despite some success in reducing regional differences and extending 
‘pacesetter’ gains to weaker sectors, ‘[t]here remained considerable differences.. between 
the core industries in the export sector .. and many consumer and social services 
[agreements].. ‘[T]he traditional German model was always vulnerable to a widening of 
wage differentials.’ (Bosch and Weinkopf  2008: 294).  
 
It took the shock of reunification and the intensification of service sector competition in 
the 1990s for this vulnerability to become evident. The effects were compounded by the 
extension of outsourcing and use of temporary agency workers. Trade unions 
representing the core workforce protected their own jobs, sometimes with wage 
concessions. They defended their members who became unemployed by upholding their 
eligibility for extended unemployment insurance and early retirement, even while the 
non-insurance parts of the social security system were being cut back. They conceded 
changes which allowed new workers to be brought in on short term and inferior contracts, 
while protecting themselves against substitution with employment protection rules. These 
strategies often took shape at the level of the firm or workplace, with works councils 
playing a leading role. Palier and Thelen (2010: 126) remark that ‘structures.. to enhance 
labor’s voice at the plant level ironically provided ideal vehicles for fuelling trends 
towards dualism when economic hard times hit.’  
 
Critics have focused on how differentiated contractual arrangements created an insider-
outsider divide, with the unions acting in the interests of their insider members. However, 
differentiation may, under certain conditions, be a strategy which maximises the total 
income of the workers affected. Horizontal differentiation between sectors and firms can 
be thought of as a strategy of ‘price discrimination’ in which each employer is charged a 
wage that depends on its ability to pay. Similarly, vertical differentiation between low 
and high skilled workers ensures that workers utilise their bargaining power fully to 
extract the maximum possible rent from the employer.  
 
A key condition for success in using a differentiation strategy to maximise the wage 
income of workers is to prevent the employer substituting cheaper labour. A high wage 
employer might close down and reopen with a new low-wage workforce, or a new 
employer may come in and employ workers at the lowest wage. Price discrimination is 
most likely to work in declining high-capital industries with a low threat of new entry, 
high specific skills on the part of workers and a high unionisation rate. To the extent that 
these conditions prevailed in parts of German industry in the 1990s, union acceptance of 
decentralisation was in the best interests of their members. It follows, conversely, that 
establishing minimum wages may not be a wage-income maximising strategy, because it 
may undermine the differentiation that raises the share of value-added going to labour.  
 
Differentiation, both horizontally across sectors and vertically in occupational 
hierarchies, may maximise labour income, but it comes at a price. It sacrifices cross-
sectoral solidarity and some dimensions of equality, like equal pay for equal work. 
Differentiated bargaining also has an institutional dimension: it implies that the ultimate 
discretion in wage fixing should be at the local level, where bargainers can calculate 
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precisely what the market (the employer) will bear. It also foregoes any attempt to 
regulate product market competition: it is a strategy for firms which are not able to pass 
on wage increases into prices, for example because they sell into competitive world 
markets. Bargaining for minimum wages may be a better strategy in sectors with limited 
workplace organisation, low barriers to entry and low specific skills, particularly if there 
is also the possibility of regulating competition in the final market for output or services.  
 
Furthermore, differentiation may have a lifecycle: in declining industries it will protect 
incumbent workers, but eventually they will retire and can be replaced more cheaply. 
Eichhorst and Marx (2009) argue that, while dualization appears to favour the core and 
help to consolidate the position of ‘insiders’, it can also have negative repercussions as 
conditions on the periphery spill over into the core. Agency workers and others on 
‘flexible’ (eg fixed-term) contracts have not been confined to the service sector: they also 
work alongside core workers in manufacturing, and encroach on employment 
opportunities. While the interests of older employed workers were protected, they are a 
shrinking group, and union membership has shrunk with them.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that, in the 2000s, leading unions sought to ‘revitalise’ 
themselves, and reconsidered their strategies. IG Metall suffered a defeat in 2003 when it 
tried to organise a working time reduction in East Germany, and also had to give way on 
allowing local derogations from collective bargains (the Pforzheim agreement). While the 
agreement was meant to regularise derogations and improve the union’s control over 
them, in practice it found itself rubber-stamping the agreements of local works councils. 
Metall also faced a battle in the court of public opinion, as the employers’ association, 
Gesamtmetall, ran a public campaign against the ‘inflexibility’ of German labour 
relations (Haipeter 2011). These pressures brought changes of strategy to Metall: local 
engagement to try to restrain concessions, a membership drive, and a higher public 
profile, particularly in campaigning against the Hartz reforms. 
 
Another union that explicitly sought to revitalise itself was Verdi, which was formed in 
2001 by a merger of five service sector unions, and became the largest union in Germany, 
overtaking IG Metall. Its base was in the public sector, and it undertook a membership 
drive to bring in workers in private service sectors, including providers of contracted-out 
public services, as well as increasing the number of women members. Particularly 
important for the minimum wage campaign was Verdi’s ability to engage in political as 
well as industrial action, linking to other ‘social movement’ campaigns. This capacity 
increased as a result of the merger of constituent unions (Annesley 2006).  
 
Verdi and Metall were leading critics of the Hartz reforms; in particular of the more 
stringent job acceptance requirements imposed on long-term unemployed workers in 
Hartz IV. Tighter work-testing meant downward pressure on wages: ALG II recipients 
could not turn down jobs on the grounds that wages were lower than collectively 
bargained rates. Unions objected to this measure, which they saw as pulling away the 
wage floor provided by the welfare state. In response, SPD President Müntefering 
suggested that a statutory minimum wage could mitigate the effects; however, he insisted 
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that this would have to be agreed and supported by the unions before the SPD would take 
the idea forward (Bispinck 2005: 22). 
 
When the unions debated the minimum wage in response to this suggestion in 2004, three 
options were supported by different unions. IG-BAU, the construction union and pioneer 
of universal application under the Posted Workers Act, favoured more use of that 
mechanism. IG Metall supported the revival of the 1952 Act, whereby the lowest 
negotiated wage in a sector could be declared to be the applicable statutory minimum 
wage. Where there was no agreement, the agreement for temporary agency workers or 
another agreement from a comparable area could be used. And a third group of unions, 
led by the Food and Catering Workers Union (Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-
Gaststaetten, NGG) and Verdi, argued for a SMW (Bispinck 2005).  
 
The preference of many unions for building a minimum wage on universal application of 
collective agreements can be readily explained. The system retains the unions’ central 
role in negotiating wages, whereas the level of a SMW would be set by the government. 
The argument is summed up by Laux (2005: 3): ‘[I]t may be a severe mistake to demand 
statutory minimum wages and hand this over to a most conservative-liberal 
government..[which] can implement its own aims’ by setting a very low minimum wage, 
just above subsistence level. The sectoral approach would build on existing bargaining 
structures; bargaining autonomy would be retained but at the same time a minimum level 
of remuneration would be guaranteed by law. 
 
The change of view that was evident by 2006, when the DGB general conference voted 
overwhelmingly to support a SMW, can be seen as a sign of the weakness of the unions: 
reservations about the state’s role were outweighed by the need to countervail employer 
power by whatever means, political or industrial, were available. But there were also 
more positive aspects. The minimum wage was a popular cause with the public, avoiding 
the taint of special interest that had come to mark public attitudes to the unions in 
Germany. Public perceptions of the unions improved markedly in the 2000s: more than 
40% held a ‘positive’ view of trade unions in 2012, whereas in 2003 45% had a negative 
view (Bispinck and Schulten 2014: 8).  
 
In 2006, the DGB endorsed the principle of a national SMW at its annual congress, but 
unions remained ambivalent and divided, as did members of the SPD. The Grand 
Coalition offered the alternative endorsed by IG-BAU, of more extensive use of the 
posted workers procedure. As noted above, there were difficulties and delays in 
establishing sectoral minimum wages in that way, which confirmed the NGG/Verdi 
stance that a single statutory minimum was the only viable policy.  
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5. A public interest in the minimum wage? 
The preference of some unions for a minimum wage established by collective bargaining 
was shared by the CDU/CSU and influential figures in the SPD. During the tenure of the 
Grand Coalition (2006-9), several steps were taken to facilitate extensions under the 
PWA. Eight low-wage sectors were brought under the Act, and collective agreements 
made and extended in most of these. Nonetheless, as the previous discussion has 
indicated, there were clearly gaps, where no agreement existed, and issues about how to 
deal with conflicting agreements in the same sector. The CDU/CSU position was 
therefore vulnerable, because competition (and hence disunity) among employers was 
impeding the process of making and extending collective agreements. 
 
In the 2009 election campaign, there was a significant distance between the SPD and 
CDU/CSU positions on one key aspect of the minimum wage debate. On the left, there 
was a mounting chorus of criticism of ‘combi-wages’ and ‘mini-jobs’, whereas the 
CDU/CSU defended these policies, emphasising how the number of people in 
employment had expanded. These policies were the fruit of innovations in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s as German policy-makers grappled with persistent long-term 
unemployment. The search for policy solutions initially focused on non-wage labour 
costs (specifically, social insurance contributions). These created a ‘wedge’ between 
costs to the employer and take-home pay which, it was argued, strongly affected 
employers’ demand for unskilled labour and individuals’ incentives to work. Proposals to 
subsidise low-paid work by meeting some insurance contributions through taxation were 
discussed in the 1990s and accepted by most parties. From the unions’ perspective, the 
proposals were acceptable as they did not threaten prevailing wage rates. (Klammer 
2000).  
 
The social insurance subsidies and exemptions were effective in promoting job creation 
in the form of ‘mini-jobs’, but they had high deadweight costs, as people substituted part-
time subsidised work for full-time work that would carry full social insurance liabilities. 
Furthermore, they contributed to the growing problem that many people would reach 
retirement age without an adequate pension to live on, having not paid sufficient 
contributions. Critics also argued that they were poorly targeted to helping groups with 
the highest social assistance entitlements, who faced the greatest risk of income loss 
when taking up low-paid work.  
 
The combi-wage model was advocated by economists in the IFO Institute in 2002, and 
embraced by other parts of Germany’s economic technocracy, including the Council of 
Economic Experts.4 They argued that social assistance recipients should have more 
opportunities to combine work and benefits. Part of their work income should be 
disregarded in calculating assistance entitlements, and the rate at which assistance abated 
as earnings rose should be reduced. These measures would provide incentives to enter 
employment. This policy was incorporated into the Hartz IV reform that created a new 
basic social assistance benefit (sometimes referred to as Arbeitslosengeld II, in reference 
to the unemployment benefit it replaced, but now more often simply called 
Grundsicherung). 





As the number of recipients of combi-wages increased, reaching some 1.4m in 2010, the 
policy was increasingly seem as a cause of Germany’s low pay problem rather than a 
solution (Eichhorst 2015: 63). Critics argued that ‘[a]ctivation policies turned out to be a 
major programme for subsidizing low-skilled employment.’ (Hassel 2014: 67). The 
salience of the issue was reflected in the way that the debate about the level of the 
proposed SMW took shape. The concept of a subsistence minimum achieved striking 
dominance. In 2006, Verdi led a union campaign for a minimum of €7.50. The basis for 
this figure was that a single person working full-time at this wage would earn a sufficient 
income not to require topping up by social assistance. 
 
Initially, some members of the SPD rejected this and advocated a level of €6.00, and 
CDU/CSU politicians who were prepared to countenance statutory intervention also 
declared for the lower rate. Others, including the SPD’s Müntefering, who had put a 
minimum wage on the table in 2004, did not commit to a specific level (Hoffmann 2006). 
In its 2009 manifesto, the SPD proposed that a Commission would fix the SMW, but 
added that €7.50 was a ‘useful orientation mark’. Most importantly, it accepted the 
principle that Verdi and others were advocating, that the wage rate should be enough for 
a single full-time worker to live on. It proposed a ‘fundamental reorganization of the 
lower income range’, with the SMW as the anchor (SPD 2009: 33).  
 
The 2013 SPD manifesto was more explicit in rejecting the low-wage road to job creation 
that had been taken since the early 2000s. While ‘Agenda 2010’ was defended as having 
got hundreds of thousands of people off social assistance, the manifesto admitted that in 
the process it also created abuse of temporary work, mini-jobs and low-waged 
employment. The goal of SPD policy would henceforth be ‘to make people independent 
of transfers and provide access to good, secure and socially insured work’ (SPD 2013: 
19). To this end, a SMW would be introduced, initially at €8.50; subsequently it would be 
uprated by a Commission.  
 
For its part, the CDU/CSU explicitly endorsed combi-wages in 2009. It argued that 
everyone should have the minimum for a decent life. A minimum wage would not ensure 
this: a combination of fair wages and additional state benefits might be needed. The key 
thing was that people should be better off in work than out of it (CDU/CSU 2009: 29). In 
2013, this argument did not appear in the manifesto. Temporary work, mini-jobs and 
part-time employment were still defended as providing necessary flexibility, but the 
possibility of abuse was also acknowledged, and the need to ensure decent wages 
accepted. The CDU/CSU argued that politicians should not determine wages, but they 
should provide the legal basis to ensure that the social partners could establish minimum 
wages (CDU/CSU 2013: 7). The main point of difference with the SPD was that the 
CDU/CSU still envisaged this as a sectoral, differentiated process: the minima should 
take into account different situations in regions and industries. 
 
In some ways, the parties were not so far apart. The SPD wanted a statutory minimum, 
but also advocated that the sectoral mechanism for establishing higher minimum wages 
through the PWA should be strengthened. The SPD was careful always to endorse the 
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leading role of the social partners. Yet in another way the two sides were speaking in 
different terms. The SPD’s insistence on uniformity across East and West Germany went 
with its focus on providing a subsistence minimum and an anchor for the welfare system. 
It also argued that higher wages were needed to boost demand. These considerations 
suggested there was a public interest in raising wages that was not necessarily captured in 
the respective interests of the social partners in wage bargaining.  
 
The preamble to the Bill introducing the SMW bridged the positions of the parties by 
specifying both the regulation of competition and the welfare anchor as motives for the 
measure. It states the objectives as being to protect workers against unreasonably low 
wages, to ensure that competition between firms is based on better quality and service 
and not done at the expense of ever lower wages for workers, and to remove the incentive 
for firms to undercut wages while relying on ‘top-ups’ from social assistance. Thus ‘the 
minimum wage will protect the financial stability of the social security system’ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2014a: 2). While the CDU/CSU could portray the SMW as a 
statutory framework that allowed the social partners to establish a wage floor, it was an 
important concession to accept the starting rate of €8.50, based as it is on the concept of a 
subsistence minimum, and also to entrench in law the setting of a single standard rate 
across sectors and regions. The SPD, for its part, conceded delayed introduction of the 
SMW in sectors where there are currently agreements on lower wages in force, along 
with other exemptions affecting young and long-term unemployed workers.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has advanced two main arguments about the advent of a SMW in Germany. 
First, a key element in creating a coalition in favour of the SMW was the interaction 
between wages and social security. The Hartz reforms removed the floor to wages created 
by unemployment benefits. Neoclassical economists embraced this, and argued that lower 
wages topped up by benefits would be an engine for job creation. Subsequently, political 
actors sought to limit this mechanism, seeing it as vulnerable to the capture of fiscal 
resources by employers. In the late 1990s, it was argued that employers externalised costs 
onto the social insurance system; by the late 2000s they were accused of externalising 
costs onto social assistance. In taking steps to protect its fiscal position, the government 
has restrained the processes that produced a large expansion of low-waged employment. 
 
Second, employers did not use wage-fixing to regulate competition. This was partly 
because export-sector employers would lose out from such regulation: they benefited 
from intense domestic competition to provide ancillary services. Some domestic 
employers did see benefits in regulation, but their efforts were undermined by free riding, 
the entry of new competitors, and the opposition of the BDA, reflecting export sector 
interests. The competitive orientation of dominant employers meant that they did not 
facilitate a protectionist response to the free movement of labour and cross-border 
provision of services, by contrast with employers in the three countries studied by Afonso 
(2011).  Even if employers had recognised the threat of state regulation, they lacked the 
capacity to act pre-emptively against it.  
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The discussion has emphasised that the fiscal concerns of the government are not 
internalised in bargaining between employers and unions. There is potentially a lack of fit 
between the ‘self-regarding’ incentives of the labour market parties and the wider public 
policy concerns of successive governments. The ‘welfare anchor’ motive for a minimum 
wage implies that the SMW should be linked permanently to the social assistance level: 
uprated in line with the Grundsicherung. However, this was not agreed by the coalition 
partners. Instead, the power to determine future increases has been delegated to a 
Commission made up of representatives from the unions and employer associations. 
There are three members from each side, a chair, and two non-voting academic advisors. 
The chair should be chosen by agreement of the parties, but, if they cannot agree, 
nominees from the respective sides will hold the position in alternate years.  
 
It is possible that the Commission will generate conflictual and unstable results. The 
employer side clearly fears that periods of union majority will see the minimum wage 
substantially ratcheted up (BDA 3 July 2014). To mitigate this risk, the BDA has 
proposed that the SMW should simply be indexed to overall wage growth. This proposal 
has been criticised by politicians, who point out that it abrogates the responsibility of the 
social partners to deliberate and formulate public interest-regarding agreements 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2014b: 3326 (Zimmer)).  
 
The introduction of the SMW represents a departure from Tarifautonomie, while the 
Commission can be seen as a reinstatement, or rebuilding, of corporatist public policy-
making. Whether this new institution will allow the social partners to make decisions 
which reconcile their ‘private’ or sectional incentives with public policy objectives has 
yet to be seen. On the government’s side, the decision to delegate, and not to keep wages 
in the political realm, points to its expectation of high transaction costs to future 
upratings, whether in the form of conflict within government or blame from the public. 
The introduction of the SMW has been politically popular: a significant ‘win’ for the 
Social Democrats as minority coalition partners, but there may be trouble down the road 
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